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This paper characterizes an optimal group loan contract with costly peer monitoring.
Using a fairly standard moral hazard framework, we show that the optimal group
lending contract could exhibit a joint-liability scheme. However, optimality of joint-
liability requires the involvement of a group leader, who heavily takes care of the
partner’s repayment share in bad states and gets compensated in expected terms.
This key result holds even for a group of borrowers, which exhibits homogeneous
characteristics in productivity, risk aversion and monitoring costs. Our work ratio-
nalizes the widely-applied group-leadership concept of microfinance programmes as
an outcome of an optimal contract.
Keywords: Micro-finance, Joint-liability, Group leader.





Group loan contracts with joint-liability schemes are extensively utilized by microfinance
programmes in developing countries, and especially in rural borrowing environments with
weak institutions. The success of Grameen Bank and other microcredit institutions in im-
plementing group enforcement mechanisms drew attention to understanding the efficiency
of joint liability agreements. In this paper we analyze the efficiency of a group lending
model where intra-group monitoring and thus joint liability agreements are costly to pro-
duce.
We develop a fairly general group lending framework where intra-group monitoring deter-
mines the benefits from private benefit actions, where the easier monitoring the higher is
the quantity of loans that can be extended to the group. Since effort needs to be spent to
monitor, a borrower chooses to monitor his peer only if this in his best interest. Therefore,
the bank has to consider borrowers’ incentives at making them jointly liable for each other’s
behavior.
Under this framework, we characterize the optimal group lending contract. The optimal
group contract - that induces peers to monitor each other and maximizes loan repayment -
exhibits a joint liability scheme. Furthermore, we show that the optimality requires a group
leader, who overpays in bad states and heavily takes care of the joint-liability scheme and
gets compensated in expected terms. This key result holds even for a group of borrowers,
which exhibits homogeneous characteristics in productivity, risk aversion and monitoring
costs. The intuition is related to the cost minimizing incentives that a profit maximizing
microfinance institution chooses to provide: The absence of a group leader generates the
possibility of multiple equilibria which undermines group’s commitment to repay. In this
respect, our results rationalize the widely applied group leader practice of microfinance
programmes as an outcome of an optimal lending contract.
Leading microfinance institutions all around the world employ group leadership practices
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in order to maintain discipline, distribute information and facilitate repayments. In other
words, the group leader functions as an intermediary between the group of borrowers and
the bank. A number of empirical studies highlighted the role of group leaders in enhancing
the performance of joint liability contracts. For instance, Paxton et al. (2000) use data of
140 group borrowers from a micro lending institution in Burkina Faso and find that the
quality of the group leader in running the group transactions is positively related to the
repayment performance, which may be seen as evidence for the importance of the group
leader at joint-liability schemes. Hermes et al. (2005) investigate the role of the group
leader in reducing moral hazard. The authors use a dataset of 102 groups from Eritrean
group lending institutions. They find evidence that the monitoring effort of the group
leader reduces moral hazard behaviour of group members. In a related paper the same
authors also show that the role of the group leader is highly relevant for improving the
repayment performance of the group (Hermes et al. (20060).
Although microfinance lending alleviates the financing constraints on the poor, empirical
evidence such as in Islam et al. (2015) show that micro-lending does not necessarily facili-
tate new business opportunities. In a related research, Garmaise and Natividad (2010) show
that relieving information problems can signicantly enhance operational efciency of micro-
finance institutions. There is a theoretical literature that aims to understand the efficiency
of microfinance programmes with a particular focus on understanding the functioning of
joint-liability group contracts in alleviating frictions caused by informational asymmetry
and enhancing productive business investment. In this respect, on the one hand, Ghatak
and Guinnane (1999) and Ghatak (2000) show that joint-liability lending contracts could
induce endogenous peer selection, state verification and endogenous enforcement of repay-
ment. Therefore, these studies argue that joint liability contracts can improve welfare and
repayment rates if standard screening instruments such as collateral are unavailable. On
the other hand, Gangopadhyay et al. (2005) claim that the joint liability lending contracts
might violate an ex post incentive-compatibility constraint which says that the amount of
joint liability cannot exceed the amount of individual liability. Other concerns have been
raised about the efficiency of joint liability lending contracts. Rai and Sjostrom (2004)
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show that it is the ability to side-contract and cross-report that is crucial for the efficiency
of group loan contracts and not necessarily the joint-liability scheme itself. Our paper
contributes to this debate by providing a characterization of optimal group lending con-
tracts with costly monitoring and showing that the optimality of joint-liability requires the
incentivization of a group leader.
Existing theoretical literature on joint liability lending mostly ignores the role of a group
leader in fostering the performance of group lending mechanisms. The institutional lending
practices mentioned above as well as the empirical evidence suggest that understanding the
benefits of group leadership deserves attention. To the best of our knowledge, the two ex-
ceptions in the literature are van Eijkel et al. (2009) and Katzur and Lensink (2010). Van
Eijkel et al. (2009) show that in a group lending contract the entrepreneur with the highest
future profits is motivated to put the highest effort to peer monitor and would desire to
become the group leader. Similarly, Katzur and Lensink (2010) find that a relatively risky
borrower would have the motivation to act as a group leader and take responsibility for his
peers’ repayment, in return for a discount on his own loan repayment.
The key difference between our model and the two studies mentioned above is that we
do not assume any ex-ante heterogeneity in exogenous characteristics within the group,
such as heterogeneity in risk attitudes and profitability. Furthermore, we derive the key
features of the group leader from an optimal joint liability contract. Therefore, our paper
makes several key contributions to the theoretical literature on joint-liability lending. First
and foremost, we characterize the properties of an optimal group lending contract, which
minimizes bank’s cost of lending. As highlighted by Bubna and Chowdhry (2010), financial
intermediaries all around the world are seeking profitable mechanisms for participating in
micro lending. Second, we derive the key characteristics of a group leader that are com-
parable to the group leader features observed in practice. Third, we show that optimal
contracts imply the desirability of a group leader even within a group of borrowers with
homogeneous characteristics. And fourth, our characterization addresses the question of
why someone would be willing to become a group leader and undertake a socially desir-
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able but individually costly action by showing that the group leader who takes care of the
burden of joint-liability gets compensated in expected terms at an optimal joint liability
contract.
There are also a number of papers that emphasize the importance of social sanctions as
disciplining devices at group loan contracts. Some examples are Besley and Coate (1995),
Wydick (1999), de Aghion (1999), and de Aghion and Murdoch (2000). Our paper endog-
enizes the provision of such social punishment devices and shows that unless group lending
contracts are supported with heterogeneity in repayment rates across borrowers at different
states of the nature, social sanctions are too costly to produce.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a standard lending problem
with moral hazard a la Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). In sections 3 and 4, we extend this
lending problem into a group lending framework, solve the optimal lending contract and
characterize the features of the group leader. Section 5 provides a discussion of our results
and section 6 concludes.
2 The Lending Problem
We consider a lending problem with moral hazard a la Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). Sup-
pose that there is a risk-neutral bank and two risk-neutral borrowers. The borrowers are
indexed as 1 and 2. Borrowers need 100% external finance to run investment projects,
where finance can be provided by the bank. Each borrower has access to a set of mutually
exclusive projects, and in the absence of right incentives they could react opportunistically
and reduce the probability of project success in order to enjoy a private benefit. Formally,
each borrower can privately choose one of the three project options that we illustrate in
table 1.
We assume that the probability of success of the good project is greater than the success
probability of bad (private benefit) projects, pi > pB, where i indexes the borrower with
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i ∈ {1, 2}. Private benefits are ordered as B > b > 0. The private benefits can be inter-
preted as opportunity costs from managing the project diligently. Either level of shirking
produces the same probability of success. This has the convenient implication that the
entrepreneur will prefer the high private benefit project (B-project) over the low private
benefit project (b-project) under any un-monitored loan contract.
Good Bad Bad
Low Pr. Benefit High Pr. Benefit
Projects (Private Benefits) 0 b B
Prob. of Success pi pB pB
Table 1: Investment Projects
Each project requires 1 unit of cash investment and generates a verifiable financial return
equaling either 0 (failure) or θ (success). We assume that the opportunity cost of unit cash
is 1. Furthermore, the rate of return on invested capital satisfies
piθ > 1 > pBθ +B,
which implies that the high private benefit projects are socially undesirable. The bank can
pay ψbank units of cash in order to eliminate the B-project from a borrower’s feasible set of
investment projects. By construction, we assume that it is too costly for the bank to rule
out the action B with individual contracts because monitoring cost per unit cash invested,
ψbank, is too large. Formally, we assume that
ψbank > piθ − 1.
As we will illustrate in the next section, we assume that the only feasible lending option in
the economy is through peer monitored joint liability contracts.
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3 Group Lending with Peer Monitoring
In this section, we incorporate peer monitoring into the framework that we presented in
section 2. The borrower i could pay ψi, which is non-verifiable by the bank, and eliminate
the high private benefit action from borrower j’s feasible project set.
We assume that
ψi < ψbank for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Bank will desire to mobilize the peer monitoring within the group in order to minimize
incentives to take private benefit actions and maximize repayment from the group loan.
The timing of actions that we consider can be represented as dynamic game consisting of
two-stages:
Stage 1:
• Borrowers 1 and 2 apply for the group lending contract.
• Bank decides on whether to extend 1 unit of cash to each borrower.
• The terms of the group loan contract are decided.
• Borrowers 1 and 2 simultaneously choose the monitoring effort - formally, whether
to spend ψi - conditional on having obtained finance.
• Borrowers’ monitoring efforts are revealed to each other, but not to the bank.
Stage 2:
• Borrower 1 and 2 decide which project to take.
• Project returns are realized.
• Borrower 1 and 2 repay back to the bank, where individual specific repayment
rates - as determined by the contractual terms - can be conditional on the
realization of one’s own project success as well as his peer’s project success.
• Borrowers and bank consume.
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4 Optimal Group Loan Contract
In this section we solve for the optimal group loan contract. In this respect, at first we
would like to note that the only observable (and hence contractible) variables for the bank
are borrower 1 and borrower 2 project realizations. Letting si ∈ {H,L} be the realization
of the borrower i’s project, we formally define an optimal group loan contract as follows.
Definition A group loan contract is a collection of repayment functions (R
si,s−i
i )i=1,2. For
instance, RH,L1 is borrower 1’s repayment when his project return is in state s1 = H, while
borrower 2 project return is in the low state, s2 = L.
Given the sequence of actions, in the first stage of the dynamic game, each borrower de-
cides whether to monitor or not. Afterwards, in the second stage, borrowers decide on
which projects to undertake. Formally, a strategy for borrower i is a pair of functions
δi : {∅} → {m,n}, and ei : H → Ai, where m stands for monitoring, n for no monitoring,
H is the collection of possible histories after the first stage game, and Ai ⊂ {0, b, B} is the
collection of player i’s feasible project opportunities in the second-stage game - character-
ized as the amount of private benefits that each project can generate.
Each borrower’s project choice in the second stage depends on the contractual terms
(R
si,s−i
i )i=1,2, and on whether he got monitored in the first stage or not and finally also
on the expectations regarding the peer borrower’s project choice. We restrict our attention
to contracts that in the second stage of the game implement actions in dominant strategies.
There are 4 possible histories that can prevail at the end of the first-stage monitoring-game.
Denoting a particular history with hk, where k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, we formalize these histories
as
h1 : (δ1, δ2) = (m,m),
h2 : (δ1, δ2) = (m,n),
h3 : (δ1, δ2) = (n,m),
h4 : (δ1, δ2) = (n, n).
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if (i) at any second-stage
sub-game that follows history hk, for k = 1, 2, 3, 4, the project choice e
hk
i is borrower i’s
dominant strategy, given that he expects borrower −i to undertake the project ehk−i, and
(ii) in the first-stage game the strategy about the monitoring decision, δi, is borrower i’s
dominant strategy, if he expects the borrower −i to choose δ−i.












in dominant strategies. Letting π(hk) denote the induced probability over history


























































































− ψi · δ + e(δ,δ−i)i
}
(1d)
In this representation, (1a) is the bank’s objective function. The constraint (1b) is borrower
i’s participation constraint. Constraints (1c) and (1d) are borrower i’s incentive compat-
ibility constraints, assuming that the contract implements actions in dominant strategies.
Constraint (1c) says that, following any history hk, borrower i takes borrower −i’s dom-
inant strategy (ehk−i) as given and optimally chooses his action e from the set of feasible
projects available at history hk, i.e. A(hk). Similarly, constraint (1d) is borrower i’s incen-
tive compatibility constraint over monitoring actions, where borrower i takes the dominant
strategy of borrower −i as given, δ−i, and plays his best response accordingly, δ ∈ {m,n},
knowing that in the second stage both borrowers will optimally be at the history (δ, δ−i).
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Using the definitions above, we characterize the optimal group lending contract which in-
duces players to coordinate on an equilibrium where borrowers undertake the good project.
By construction this is the equilibrium in the economy which maximizes the aggregate
welfare, because private projects have negative net present value. Hence, solving for the
good-project-equilibrium will lead us to obtain the terms of the welfare maximizing group
loan contract. Throughout our analysis we assume that in the absence of monitoring, bor-
rowers will be tempted to undertake the high private benefit project - implying without
peer monitoring lending would not become socially desirable. Therefore, the optimal con-
tract will be the one, which induces borrowers to monitor each other in the first-stage game
and choose the good project in the second-stage game. This means that the bank desires to
induce the players coordinate on (δ1, δ2) = (m,m) in the first stage. In the second stage the
socially desirable action is the choice of the good project (0). Formally, the bank prefers
the outcome (e1, e2) = (0, 0) in the second-stage.
The available actions in the second-stage depend on the prevailing history after the first-
stage, since monitoring in the first-stage rules out the high private benefit action from
peer’s project set. This means conditional on the first-stage outcomes, the strategy space
of the second-stage game can include {“the good project”, “the bad project with low private
benefit”, and “the bad project with high private benefit”}. For the rest of the analysis, we
will call the good project as action-0, the bad project with low private benefit as action-b,
and the bad project with high private benefit as action-B.
Our claim is as follows. The least costly way for the bank to ensure that (δ1, δ2) = (m,m)
in the first-stage and (e1, e2) = (0, 0) in the second-stage is the unique equilibrium of the
dynamic group lending game is as follows: (i) The action-m (monitor) in the first-stage
should be a dominant strategy for a particular borrower i and a best response for the
borrower j ( 6= i) given he expects the borrower i to play m; and, (ii) the action-0 (no
private benefit) in the second-stage following the history h1 should be a dominant strategy
for any borrower k and a best response for the borrower l (6= k) given he expects k to
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play 0. We will discuss that any deviation from these proposed incentive schemes results
in either (a) a no-monitoring equilibrium, or (b) an unstable monitoring equilibrium, or (c)
a monitoring equilibrium with inefficiently high transfers from the bank to the borrowers.




based on which the outcomes at each second-stage sub-game are characterized as follows.
History h1
As we describe in table 2 below, following the positive monitoring choice of both peers in
stage-1, which leads to the history h1, the strategy space for the two borrowers contain
only two possible actions, {0, b}, in the second-stage sub-game.
0 b
0
p1(θ − p2RHH1 − (1− p2)RHL1 ), p1(θ − pBRHH1 − (1− pB)RHL1 ),
p2(θ − p1RHH2 − (1− p1)RLH2 ) pB(θ − p1RHH2 − (1− p1)RLH2 ) + b
b
pB(θ − p2RHH1 − (1− p2)RHL1 ) + b, pB(θ − pBRHH1 − (1− pB)RHL1 ) + b,
p2(θ − pBRHH2 − (1− pB)RLH2 ) pB(θ − pBRHH2 − (1− pB)RLH2 ) + b
Table 2: Second-stage sub-game that follows history h1
In table 2, we let the row player to represent the borrower 1, and the column player to
represent the borrower 2. Accordingly with this choice, the first payoff in each box corre-
sponds to borrower 1, while the second payoff corresponds to borrower 2. As an example,
if both borrowers behave diligently and choose the action 0, the payoffs are those in the
top-left box, where borrower 1’s payoff is p1(θ− p2RHH1 − (1− p2)RHL1 ), while borrower 2’s
payoff is p2(θ − p1RHH2 − (1− p1)RLH2 ).
11
As we delineated before, at individual payoffs, RHH1 is the repayment of borrower 1 when
the projects of both borrowers pay off. RHL1 is the repayment of borrower 1 when his project
pays off and borrower 2’s doesn’t. By limited liability when borrower 1’s project does not
pay out, no repayment can be enforced from him (since the return from the investment
project in the bad state equals to zero). Therefore, we do not specify RLH1 and R
LL
1 . For
borrower 2, similarly RHH2 and R
LH
2 are respective repayments when both projects pay out
and when borrower 2’s project pays out borrower 1’s doesn’t. We allow the possibility of
RHL1 > R
HH




2 to capture a joint liability scheme as an outcome of
the optimizing contract.
In the second-stage sub-game that follows the history h1, (0, 0) is the unique equilibrium
if, without loss of generality, (a) for borrower 1 the action 0 (good project) is a dominant
strategy and (b) 0 is a best response for borrower 2 given that he expects borrower 1 to
play 0. Formally, denoting EU i as the expected utility from the second-stage sub-game for
borrower i, (0, 0) is a unique equilibrium of the sub-game if the following three constraints
hold for borrowers 1 and 2:
EU1(0, 0) ≥ EU1(b, 0),
EU1(0, b) ≥ EU1(b, b),
EU2(0, 0) ≥ EU2(0, b),
where in each expectation operator the first argument is borrower 1’s action choice and the
second argument is borrower’s 2 choice of action. These constraints can be expressed as
the following:
p1(θ − p2RHH1 − (1− p2)RHL1 ) ≥ pB(θ − p2RHH1 − (1− p2)RHL1 ) + b, (2)
p1(θ − pBRHH1 − (1− pB)RHL1 ) ≥ pB(θ − pBRHH1 − (1− pB)RHL1 ) + b, (3)
p2(θ − p1RHH2 − (1− p1)RLH2 ) ≥ pB(θ − p1RHH2 − (1− p1)RLH2 ) + b. (4)
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Constraints (2) and (3) implement the project-0 a strictly dominant strategy for borrower
1 whereas the constraint 4 is to implement project-0 as a best response for borrower 2
given that he expects the borrower 1 to play 0. The constraint (3) is needed (such that
the project-0 becomes a strictly dominant strategy for borrower 1); otherwise, we would
end up with multiple equilibria in the sub-game that follows h1. Specifically, without
EU1(0, b) > EU1(b, b), (0, 0) is still a Nash equilibrium in the second-stage game that
follows history h1; however, (b, b) would also be a Nash Equilibrium. The multiplicity of
equilibria might be undesirable, because low private benefit (b) actions have negative net
present value. Therefore, if beliefs regarding coordinating on the bad Nash equilibrium
(b, b) are high enough, this might result in with a collapse in lending. Therefore, the ac-
tion 0 (good project) must be incentivized for at least one of the borrowers as a dominant
strategy to rule out the multiplicity.
Also, (0, 0) is still a unique equilibrium if EU2(0, 0) > EU2(b, b) holds for borrower 2
in addition to the constraints (2)-(4). We will show below that this constraint holds for
borrower 2 as well, implying that the choice of project-0 is a strictly dominating action for
him, when we jointly evaluate the equilibrium uniqueness in sub-games that follow histories
h1 and h2. Inequalities (2) and (3) together imply
θ − b
p1 − pB
≥ max{p2RHH1 + (1− p2)RHL1 , pBRHH1 + (1− pB)RHL1 }. (5)
The inequality (4) implies
θ − b
p2 − pB
≥ p1RHH2 + (1− p1)RLH2 . (6)
We conclude with the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1 When conditions (5) and (6) are jointly satisfied, (0, 0) is the unique equilib-
rium of the second-stage game that follows history h1.
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History h2
If borrower 1 monitors whereas borrower 2 doesn’t monitor in stage-1, we end up with
the history h2 at the end of the first-stage game. As we describe in table 3 below, in
this case the second-stage strategy space for borrower 1 contains all three project opportu-
nities {0, b, B} whereas the strategy space for borrower 2 consists of only two projects {0, b}.
0 b
0
p1(θ − p2RHH1 − (1− p2)RHL1 ), p1(θ − pBRHH1 − (1− pB)RHL1 ),
p2(θ − p1RHH2 − (1− p1)RLH2 ) pB(θ − p1RHH2 − (1− p1)RLH2 ) + b
b
pB(θ − p2RHH1 − (1− p2)RHL1 ) + b, pB(θ − pBRHH1 − (1− pB)RHL1 ) + b,
p2(θ − pBRHH2 − (1− pB)RLH2 ) pB(θ − pBRHH2 − (1− pB)RLH2 ) + b
B
pB(θ − p2RHH1 − (1− p2)RHL1 ) +B, pB(θ − pBRHH1 − (1− pB)RHL1 ) +B,
p2(θ − pBRHH2 − (1− pB)RLH2 ) pB(θ − pBRHH2 − (1− pB)RLH2 ) + b
Table 3: Second-stage sub-game that follows history h2
In the second-stage sub-game which follows the history h2, the bank desires to have (B, 0) as
the unique equilibrium of the game, which is true if the project-B is a dominant strategy
for borrower 1 and the project-0 is a best response for borrower 2 given he expects the
borrower 1 to choose B. The bank incentivizes the action-B for borrower 1 in this sub-
game in order to utilize the action B to punish the “no-monitor” behavior of borrower 2
in the first-stage: If borrower 1 chooses B in the second-stage it lowers the likelihood of its
own repayment, which under the joint liability scheme will increase the repayment burden
on borrower 2 and discipline him to undertake the action to monitor as a best response to
borrower 1’s monitoring behavior in the first-stage. Formally, the bank desires
EU1(B, 0) ≥ EU1(0, 0),
EU1(B, b) ≥ EU1(0, b),
EU2(B, 0) ≥ EU2(B, b),
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which are expressed as the following:
pB(θ − p2RHH1 − (1− p2)RHL1 ) +B ≥ p1(θ − p2RHH1 − (1− p2)RHL1 ), (7)
pB(θ − pBRHH1 − (1− pB)RHL1 ) +B ≥ p1(θ − pBRHH1 − (1− pB)RHL1 ), (8)
p2(θ − pBRHH2 − (1− pB)RLH2 ) ≥ pB(θ − pBRHH2 − (1− pB)RLH2 ) + b. (9)
Constraints (7) and (8) implement the project-B as a strictly dominant strategy for bor-
rower 1 and the project-0 as a best response for borrower 2 given he expects the borrower
1 to play B. We would like to highlight that at history h2 the constraint (8) is needed;
otherwise, we would end up with multiple equilibria in the second-stage continuation game
following the history h2. The undesirability of multiple equilibria in this sub-game can be
argued along the lines of our discussions that we presented above at the case of history h1.
An immediate question that we need to answer is whether inequalities (2) and (7) can
be satisfied at the same time. The answer is yes. The two constraints can be satisfied




≤ min{p2RHH1 + (1− p2)RHL1 , pBRHH1 + (1− pB)RHL1 }. (10)
The inequality (9) reduces to
pBR
HH




and we conclude with the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2 Inequalities (6) and (11) jointly imply that at the history h1 playing 0 is also
a dominant strategy for the 2nd borrower.
Therefore, in the sub-game that the bank desires the two borrowers to play in the second-
stage, the good project (action 0) is not only a unique Nash equilibrium, but also an
equilibrium in dominant strategies.
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History h3
If borrower 1 does not monitor and the borrower 2 monitors in the first-stage game, we
end up at history h3. As we describe in table 5 below, at history h3, the strategy space of
the borrower 1 consist of only feasible project options, {0, b}, whereas the strategy space
of the borrower 2 consists of {0, b, B}.
- Table 5 here -
In the second-stage sub-game that follows history h3, similar to history h2, the bank would
desire to have (0, B) as the unique equilibrium of the second stage sub-game, which is true
if the action B is a dominant strategy for borrower 2 and the action 0 is a best response
for borrower 1 given he expects the borrower 2 to play B.
Formally, the bank desires that the following conditions to hold for borrowers 1 and 2
EU2(0, B) ≥ EU2(0, 0),
EU2(b, B) ≥ EU2(b, 0),
EU1(0, B) ≥ EU1(b, B),
which can be expressed as the following:
pB(θ − p1RHH2 − (1− p1)RLH2 ) +B ≥ p2(θ − p1RHH2 − (1− p1)RLH2 ), (12)
pB(θ − pBRHH2 − (1− pB)RLH2 ) +B ≥ p2(θ − pBRHH2 − (1− pB)RLH2 ), (13)
p1(θ − pBRHH1 − (1− pB)RHL1 ) ≥ pB(θ − pBRHH1 − (1− pB)RHL1 ) + b. (14)
Similar to history h2, at history h3 the constraints (13) and (14) induce the action-B to
be a dominant strategy for borrower 2 and the constraint (12) induces the action-0 to be a
best response for borrower 1 given that he expects the borrower 2 to play B. We need the
constraint (13) in order to rule out multiplicity of equilibria in the second-stage sub-game.
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The inequalities (12) and (13) can be compactly written as:
θ − B
p2 − pB
≤ min{p1RHH2 + (1− p1)RLH2 , pBRHH2 + (1− pB)RLH2 }. (15)
Lemma 4.3 The inequality (14) will be satisfied as long as the inequality (4) is not violated.
The lemma 4.3 implies that the implementation of project-0 for a borrower 1 as a strictly
dominant strategy at history h1 also ensures that the project-0 is a best response for the
same borrower 1 if the history h3 would prevail as an outcome of the first-stage game.
History h4
As we describe in table 6 below, when neither of the players monitor in the first stage game
we end up with the history h4, where the available actions in the second-stage game include
{0, b, B} for both borrowers.
At history h4, by construction, we assume that both borrowers take the action B, with the
following expected utilities:
EU1(B,B) = pB(θ − pBRHH1 − (1− pB)RHL1 ) +B, (16)
EU2(B,B) = pB(θ − pBRHH2 − (1− pB)RLH2 ) +B. (17)
- Table 6 here -
Since the outcome of the sub-game following h4 is socially undesirable, the bank chooses
to implement strategies in the first-stage game to avoid the likelihood of ending up with a
history h4 as an outcome of the first-stage game.
The Supergame
The expected payoffs of the supergame are illustrated in table 4.
The super-game pay-off matrix presents what each continuation sub-game outcome payoffs




p1(θ − p2RHH1 − (1− p2)RHL1 ), pB(θ − p2RHH1 − (1− p2)RHL1 ) +B,
p2(θ − p1RHH2 − (1− p1)RLH2 ) p2(θ − pBRHH2 − (1− pB)RLH2 )
n
p1(θ − pBRHH1 − (1− pB)RHL1 ), pB(θ − pBRHH1 − (1− pB)RHL1 ) +B
pB(θ − p1RHH2 − (1− p1)RLH2 ) +B pB(θ − pBRHH2 − (1− pB)RLH2 ) +B
Table 4: Supergame
of them monitor each other (m,m) are the outcomes of the sub-game that follows history
h1 as we delineated above.
In the super-game, the bank would like to implement the action to monitor as a dominant
strategy for one of the borrowers and a best response for the other borrower. Without
loss of generality, we pick borrower 1 and implement the monitoring action as a strictly
dominant strategy for him, whereas we induce to monitor a best response for the borrower
2 given that he expects the borrower 1 to monitor. Formally, denoting expected super-game
payoff of the borrower i with EV i, we state these conditions as
EV 1(m,m) ≥ EV 1(n,m),
EV 1(m,n) ≥ EV 1(n, n),
EV 2(m,m) ≥ EV 2(m,n),
which can be expressed as the following
p1(θ − p2RHH1 − (1− p2)RHL1 )− ψ1 ≥ p1(θ − pBRHH1 − (1− pB)RHL1 ), (18)
pB(θ − p2RHH1 − (1− p2)RHL1 )− ψ1 +B ≥ pB(θ − pBRHH1 − (1− pB)RHL1 ) +B,(19)
p2(θ − p1RHH2 − (1− p1)RLH2 )− ψ2 ≥ p2(θ − pBRHH2 − (1− pB)RLH2 ), (20)
18













In the super-game, we need the constraint (19) to hold (such that to monitor is a strictly
dominant strategy for the borrower 1) in order to rule out the multiplicity of equilibria
in the first-stage monitoring game. Otherwise, in addition to (m,m) the strategies (n, n)
also yield another Nash equilibrium, where monitoring doesn’t occur. When (n, n) is the
outcome of the first-stage game, we end up at history h4, which leads to a second-stage
sub-game, where the high private benefit bad project (B) is the strictly dominant action for
both borrowers. Since action B has a negative net present value; and therefore, undesirable
from the perspective of the bank, depending on the belief structure governing the first-stage
game, equilibrium multiplicity in the first-stage might imply break down of lending.
Since pB < p2, it is easy to note that if (22) holds (21) will be satisfied; and, therefore the
constraint (21) can be ignored.
Bank’s Problem: Now we can state the problem of the bank. The bank implements the
unique equilibrium, where borrowers monitor each other in the first-stage game and act















2 ) + (1− p2)RHL1 ] + (1− p1)p2RLH2 (24)










≥ max{p2RHH1 + (1− p2)RHL1 , pBRHH1 + (1− pB)RHL1 }, (27)
θ − b
p2 − pB
≥ max{p1RHH2 + (1− p1)RLH2 , pBRHH2 + (1− pB)RLH2 }, (28)
θ − B
p1 − pB
≤ min{p2RHH1 + (1− p2)RHL1 , pBRHH1 + (1− pB)RHL1 }, (29)
θ − B
p2 − pB
≤ min{p1RHH2 + (1− p1)RLH2 , pBRHH2 + (1− pB)RLH2 }, (30)
together with non-negativity of the set {RHH1 , RHL1 , RHH2 , RLH2 } and limited liability of the
borrowers such that the elements of {RHH1 , RHL1 , RHH2 , RLH2 } do not exceed θ. First, we
note that constraints (29) and (30) are satisfied for B large enough. Therefore, we ignore
these two constraints for the moment. From (25) and (26) we can observe the joint liability
property of the optimal group lending contract, which we formally state in the following
proposition.







Using the joint liability property at (27) and (28) shows that
[p2R
HH
1 + (1− p2)RHL1 ]− [pBRHH1 + (1− pB)RHL1 ] = (p2 − pB)(RHH1 −RHL1 ) < 0, (31)
[p1R
HH
2 + (1− p1)RLH2 ]− [pBRHH2 + (1− pB)RLH2 ] = (p2 − pB)(RHH2 −RLH2 ) < 0, (32)
which reduces constraints (27) and (28) to:
θ − b
p1 − pB
≥ pBRHH1 + (1− pB)RHL1 , (33)
θ − b
p2 − pB
≥ pBRHH2 + (1− pB)RLH2 . (34)
20
Therefore, we are left with with 4 inequalities and 4 unknowns. RHH1 enters constraints
(25) and (33) with the same sign. Therefore, given RHL1 the bank will desire to raise R
HH
1
such that constraints (25) and (33) will both be binding. The same property is true for













Plugging these in - binding - (33) and (34) provides:














Solving for RHH1 and R
HH
2 provides the repayments for borrowers 1 and 2 when both
projects have the high return realization:




















Comparing (35) against (36) and (37) against (38) provides the following result.






1 even if p1 = p2 ≡ p and ψ1 = ψ2.
Proposition 4.4 indicates a heterogeneity in optimal repayment rates. This heterogeneity
implies the presence of a “monitoring incentivized” borrower within a homogeneous group,
who overpays in bad states and gets compensated in good states. Specifically, borrower
1 takes the burden - and hence the penalty - of the joint liability by paying significantly
more in bad states and taking care of his peer, which disciplines him and induces a strictly
dominating monitoring action in the first-stage game. Borrower 1 gets his reward in high
states by underpaying relative to borrower 2.
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Now, let us define
p1 = p2 ≡ p,
ψ1 = ψ2 ≡ ψ.

































































































We finalize our theoretical discussion with the following result.
Proposition 4.6 EV1(m,m) > EV2(m,m).
Evaluating propositions 4.4 and 4.5 together shows that the optimal group loan contract
implies that borrower 1 experiences a more volatile consumption profile compared to bor-
rower 2; however, the overall expected consumption of borrower 1 is greater than borrower
2’s expected consumption. This result is quite crucial, because it points out the desirability
of a “group leader”, who is willing to accept consumption volatility in return for an ex-
pected consumption premium. We delineate our discussions concerning group leaders and
heterogeneity in repayment terms below in section 5.
We would like to highlight that our results hold as long as ψ < b; otherwise, the repayment
in the low-state of the other induces a transfer from the borrower to the bank, which implies
the violation of the limited liability constraint as we discussed before.
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5 Discussion
What drives the optimality of heterogeneous repayment rates in the group lending frame-
work that we analyze? The technical answer is the presence of the strong constraint (19)





and the lack of analog constraint for borrower 2.
Above we explained that we need this constraint in order to rule out an undesirable mul-
tiple equilibria situation in the first-stage game. The intuition is straightforward, a “no-
monitoring” equilibrium in the first-stage game leads to socially inefficient high private
benefit actions in sub-sequent second-stage games. The next question that we need to
address is why the bank would not impose the analog of constraint (19) for borrower 2?
The answer is that, because imposing this additional constraint would set the repayments
of two borrowers equal such that RHH1 = R
HH
2 ≡ RH and RHL1 = RLH2 ≡ RL with:















Comparing (42) and (43) against the repayment rates we obtained in the previous section
- (35) through (38) - shows that when monitoring is a strictly dominant strategy for both
borrowers, the expected aggregate repayment that bank would obtain from the group is
lower compared to the case where monitoring is strictly dominant for only one player. The
intuition is that incentivizing monitoring increases rents that need to be redistributed to
borrowers resulting from the monitoring action.
Repayment heterogeneity and in particular assigning a borrower to take care the burden of
the joint-liability in bad states and rewarding him in good states suggests that a “leader”
among a group of homogeneous borrowers is an outcome of the optimal group lending
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contract. Group leaders are commonly practiced by microfinance institutions as part of
joint-liability agreements. For instance, Gramin Vikash Bank, a leading microfinance insti-
tution in India, states on its web-site the following: “The (group) leader fosters a sense of
unity, oversees and maintains discipline, shares information and facilitates repayments. For
the bank, he is the focal point for group activities.”1 In other words, the group leader is the
intermediary between the group of borrowers and the bank. As discussed by van Eijkel et
al. (2009), depending on the structure of the loan contract, group leaders may be paid for
their intermediation services. Microfinance institutions all around the world apply similar
“group leadership” agreements at joint-liability lending contracts. To this end, some other
leading microfinance institutions, which require group leadership at joint-liability lending
contracts Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, Banco Sol in Bolivia and Bank Rakyat in Indone-
sia.
There is a number of empirical studies, highlighting the role of group leaders in enhancing
the performance of joint liability contracts. Paxton et al. (2000) use data of 140 group
borrowers from a micro lending institution in Burkina Faso and find that the quality of
the group leader in running the group transactions is positively related to the repayment
performance, which may be seen as evidence for the importance of the group leader at
joint-liability schemes. Hermes et al. (2005) investigate the role of the group leader in
reducing moral hazard. The authors use dataset of of 102 groups from Eritrean group
lending institutions. They find evidence that monitoring of the group leader reduce moral
hazard behaviour of group members. In a related paper the same authors show that the
role of the group leader is highly relevant for improving the repayment performance of the
group (Hermes et al., 2006).
Existing theoretical literature on joint liability lending contracts hardly dealt with the spe-
cific role of the group leader in fostering the performance of group lending mechanisms.
However, the institutional lending practices mentioned above as well as the empirical ev-
idence suggest a vital role for the leader in the functioning of the group. To the best
1http://www.bgvb.co.in/JointLiabilityGroup.aspx
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of our knowledge, the two exceptions in the literature are van Eijkel et al. (2009) and
Katzur and Lensink (2010). Van Eijkel et al. (2009) show that in a group lending contract
the entrepreneur with the highest future profits is motivated to put the highest effort to
peer monitor and would desire to become the group leader. Similarly, Katzur and Lensink
(2010) find that a relatively risky borrower would choose to act as a group leader and take
responsibility for his peers’ repayment, in return for a discount on his own loan repayment.
The key difference between our model and the above mentioned two studies is that we do
not assume an ex-ante heterogeneity among the group of borrowers, such as heterogeneity in
risk attitudes and profitability. Therefore, our paper makes several key contributions to the
theoretical literature on joint-liability lending contracts with endogenous group leadership.
First, we characterize the properties of an optimal group lending contract using a fairly
standard moral hazard framework. Second, we endogenously derive the key characteristics
of a group leader that are comparable to the group leader features observed in practice.
Third, we show that optimal contracts imply the desirability of a group leader even within
a group of borrowers with homogeneous characteristics. And fourth, our characterization
addresses the question of why someone would be willing to become a group leader and
undertake a socially desirable but individually costly action by showing that the group
leader who takes care of the burden of joint-liability gets compensated in expected terms
as an outcome of the optimal joint liability contract.
6 Conclusion
We developed a group lending framework where peer monitoring determines the benefits
from private benefit actions of borrowers. In our framework, a borrower chooses to monitor
his peer only if this is in his best interest. Therefore, the bank has to consider borrowers’
incentives at making them jointly liable for each other’s behavior. Under this framework,
we characterized the optimal group lending contract. We showed that the optimal group
contract exhibits a joint liability scheme. Furthermore, we also showed that the optimal-
ity requires a group leader, who overpays in bad states and gets compensated in good
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states. Our work rationalizes the widely applied group-leadership concept of microfinance
programmes as an outcome of an optimal lending contract.
Our conclusions make important contributions to the theoretical literature on joint-liability
lending. We characterized the properties of an optimal group lending contract using a fairly
standard moral hazard framework. Second, we derived the key characteristics of a group
leader that are comparable to the group leader features observed in practice. Third, we
showed that optimal contracts imply the desirability of a group leader even within a group
of borrowers with homogeneous characteristics. And fourth, using our characterization we
addressed the question of why someone would be willing to become a group leader and
undertake a socially desirable but individually costly action.
The introduction of a group-leader is an efficient endogenous mechanism that rules out
the possibility of coordination failures in the implementation of the efficient contract. We
obtained this result within the most simple setup that we could consider: we assumed that
the bank implements actions in dominant strategies. To this end, it would be interesting
to generalize the coordination game. A possibility would be to model a global game envi-
ronment, where borrowers receive noisy signals on the enforcement choice other borrowers.
We conjecture that the noise structure will select the equilibrium of play, and the role of a
group leader will depend on how noisy the signal is.
It would be also interesting to generalize our model to the case of an arbitrary N -number of
borrowers: With such specification, would there be just one group-leader? And how would
the optimal incentive structure look like? Would there be hierarchy among the borrowers?
These are all interesting extensions that go beyond the purpose of the paper, and we leave
them to future research.
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p2(θ − p1RHH2 − (1− p1)RLH2 ) pB(θ − p1RHH2 − (1− p1)RLH2 ) + b pB(θ − p1RHH2 − (1− p1)RLH2 ) +B
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Table 5: Second-stage sub-game that follows history h3
0 b B
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b
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B
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Table 6: Second-stage sub-game that follows history h4
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